

Message Text

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AECE-00 FEA-02 SCI-06 /212 W
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P R 011443Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7434

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

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AMEMBASSY WARSAW

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MOSCOW 4704

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE AND MEPC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR

SUBJ: USSR QUARTERLY TRENDS

1. SUMMARY. THE SOVIET REGIME PERSISTS IN PURSUING DETENTE WITH UNDIMINISHED GUSTO. THE LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO SEE - AND THE PRESS CONTINUES TO ADVERTISE - PRESIDENT NIXON'S COMING VISIT AS A MAJOR EVENT. THE TONE OF MOSCOW'S APPROACH TO DETENTE IS CHANGING SOMEWHAT, AS EVIDENCED BY A GREATER VOLUME OF HAWKISH STATEMENTS BY DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO AND MORE TENDENTIOUS PRESS TREATMENT OF THE WEST. BUT WE CAN DISCERN NO SIGNS OF SIGNIFICANT SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE OVERALL WISDOM OF THE POLICY. ON MAJOR EAST-WEST ISSUES: THE SOVIET DESIRE TO PLAY A CSCE SUMMIT AS ANOTHER FOREIGN POLICY VICTORY IS BEGINNING TO PRODUCE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN GENEVA; MOSCOW PROBABLY WANTS TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION OVER BERLIN, BUT MAY REQUIRE SOME ALLIED REASSURANCES REGARDING BONN'S INTENTIONS; AND THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE IN NO HURRY IN THE MBFR TALKS. WITH SPECIFIC REGARD TO THE UNITED STATES, THE CREDIT ISSUE IS STILL CAUSING CONCERN AND ON SALT THE PROSPECT IS FOR CONTINUED SOVIET TOUGHNESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE MIDDLE EAST SOVIET MOTIVES ARE STILL SOMEWHAT CLOUDED; THEIR HELPFULNESS IN A SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS PROBABLY DEPENDS ON THEIR ASSESSMENT OF HOW IT WILL ENHANCE THEIR POSITION WITH THE ARABS. MEANWHILE, SOVIET PREOCCUPATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT ARE GROWING. THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN CHINA, PLUS THE TWO RECENT DIPLOMATIC REBUFFS DEALT
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MOSCOW BY PEKING, HAVE THRUST THE PRC BACK INTO THE FOREFRONT OF SOVIET CONCERNS. MOSCOW WILL ALSO HAVE TO DEVOTE MORE ATTENTION TO A RELATED ISSUE - PREPARATIONS FOR A EUROPEAN AND A WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. INTERNALLY, THE ECONOMY IS PICKING UP AND BREZHNEV IS PUSHING A MAJOR NEW INITIATIVE IN AGRICULTURE. AND THE SOVIET LEADER'S OWN PERSONAL STANDING AND POWER SEEM TO BE ON AN UPWARD CURVE. END SUMMARY.

2. LEONID ILYICH, HEAD OF THE POLITBURO. SINCE THE FIRST OF THE YEAR, BREZHNEV HAS FURTHER CONSOLIDATED HIS ROLE AS NATIONAL LEADER AND SPOKESMAN. HIS POLITBURO PEERS IN PUBLIC SPEECHES HAVE TAKEN TO REFERRING TO HIM AS "LEONID ILYICH" (JUST AS THEY REFER TO LENIN AS "VLADIMIR ILYICH") AND HAVE BEGUN APPLYING TO HIM THE RITUAL (AND EXTRA-LEGAL) TITLE "HEAD OF THE POLITBURO." AFTER LONG RESISTING THIS PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF BREZHNEV'S PRE-EMINENCE, BOTH PODGORNYY AND KOSYGIN FELL INTO LINE DURING THE CEREMONIES CONNECTED WITH KOSYGIN'S 70TH BIRTHDAY IN FEBRUARY. BREZHNEV MAY BE TAKING ON THE AURA OF UNTOUCHABLE NATIONAL LEADER. IF HIS COLLEAGUES PERMIT THIS TO HAPPEN - AS THEY SEEM TO BE - THEY MUST ACCEPT THAT IT MEANS A NARROWING OF THEIR OWN OPTIONS AS A COLLECTIVE AND IMPROVES BREZHNEV'S ABILITY TO OVERRIDE THEM IN THE EVENT OF A FUTURE POLICY CRUNCH. KOSYGIN SEEMS TO BE SLIDING RELATIVE TO BREZHNEV; PODGORNYY SEEMS ROBUST AND ACTIVE; AND SOME OF THE YOUNGER LUMPNIES HAVE JUMPED ON THE BREZHNEV BANDWAGON, AT LEAST IN THEIR SPEECHES.

3. AGRICULTURE. BREZHNEV IS NO NEWCOMER TO AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS, AND HIS RECENT INITIATIVE - CULMINATING IN THE FANFARE OF HIS ALMA ATA SPEECH MARCH 15 - INDICATES A RESUMPTION OF HIS POLICY LEADERSHIP IN THIS FIELD. THE BASIC INGREDIENTS OF HIS FARM PROGRAM - A REVAMPED RURAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE CREATION OF LARGE SPECIALIZED FARMS AND PROCESSING CENTERS - ARE DIRECTED AT REDUCING THE GREAT FLUCTUATIONS IN ANNUAL HARVESTS WHICH HAVE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY. THE LUKEWARM RESPONSE TO HIS REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS
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SUGGESTS THAT THE AGRICULTURAL BUREAUCRACY, AND PERHAPS AGRICULTURE MINISTER POLYANSKIY AS WELL, MAY FEEL THREATENED. IF BREZHNEV SUCCESSFULLY PERSEVERES, HOWEVER, THE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE IMPORTANT FOR WORLD TRADE IN FOOD AS WELL AS FOR BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL POSITION.

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7435

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

USMISSION BERLIN

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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

DIA WASHDC

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AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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4. SOLZHENITSYN. THE GULAG AFFAIR, WHICH SPANNED MOST OF THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1974, PROVIDED SOME INSTRUCTIVE INSIGHT INTO THE RELATIVE PRIORITIES OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND DETENTE. THE NATURE OF GULAG - A DOCUMENTED ASSAULT ON THE SOVIET SECRET POLICE - OBVIOUSLY REQUIRED A RESPONSE, BUT DETENTE CONSIDERATIONS IMPELLED THE LEADERSHIP TO SETTLE FOR EXPULSION. IT APPEARS FROM HERE THAT THE REGIME IS OVER THE HUMP AS FAR AS FOREIGN REACTION TO SOLZHENITSYN IS CONCERNED. STILL, THE PROSPECT OF POLEMICS BY THE WRITER NOW THAT HIS FAMILY IS SAFELY OUT AND THE EFFECT OF GULAG'S PUBLICATION IN THE U.S. AND ELSEWHERE MUST STILL BE WORRISOME. INTERNALLY THE NOISE HAS ALSO TAPERED OFF, BUT OUT-SPOKENNESS BY FRINGE ESTABLISHMENT FIGURES COULD FOLLOW THE PROTESTS ALREADY MADE BY YEVTUSHENKO AND NEKRASOV. THE STATEMENT GIVEN TO WESTERN JOURNALISTS BY THE SCULPTOR NEIZVESTNY, COMPLAINING ABOUT LIMITS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL, IS AN EXAMPLE. A SCHOLARLY COMPILATION OF DOCUMENTS ON THE SOLZHENITSYN AFFAIR, PUT TOGETHER BY SAKHAROV AND HIS PROTEGES, IS CURRENTLY IN CIRCULATION IN MOSCOW. IT INCLUDES LETTERS OF SUPPORT SENT TO PRAVDA BY INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT PART OF THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED CIRCLE OF DISSIDENTS. CONTINUED OUTSPOKENNESS DOMESTICALLY COULD PROVIDE ADDED AMMUNITION AGAINST DETENTE FOR DOOM-SAYERS IN THE KGB.

5. GRECHKO ON DEFENSE. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAS SPOKEN FREQUENTLY DURING THE LAST QUARTER ABOUT THE CONTINUOUS EXPANSION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER. WE THINK IT WOULD BE AN EXAGGERATION TO READ HIS TOUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS AS A REFLECTION OF OPPOSITION TO DETENTE. IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT THE MILITARY SHOULD COUNSEL CAUTION ON SALT AND MBFR AND LOBBY FOR ITS SHARE OF THE RESOURCE PIE. GRECHKO'S STATEMENTS ARE PROBABLY ALSO A REACTION TO U.S. PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF DEFENSE ISSUES AND A RATHER SUBDUED RATTling OF BARGAINING CHIPS. THE
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DEGREE OF DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO INCREASED SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING REMAINS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE. IN ANY CASE, BREZHNEV'S GRANDIOSE PLANS FOR AGRICULTURE NOTWITHSTANDING, THERE SEEMS NO NEAR-TERM PROSPECT THAT MILITARY BUDGET ALLOCATIONS ARE THREATENED WITH DIVERSION TO OTHER SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY.

6. SOVIET WESTPOLITIK. THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1974 PRODUCED NO EVIDENCE THAT MOSCOW IS FLAGGING IN ITS COMMITMENT TO DETENTE WITH THE WEST. DESPITE A

BREZHNEV-POMPIDOU SUMMIT WHICH PRESERVED ATMOSPHERICS BUT LITTLE ELSE, A GATHERING SQUALL WITH THE FRG OVER BERLIN, AND A CONTINUING PROBLEM WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS, THE LEADERSHIP HAS HAD NO SECOND THOUGHTS THAT WE CAN DISCERN. WITH SPECIFIC REGARD TO THE U.S., THE SOVIETS GAVE GREAT PUBLIC EMPHASIS DURING SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT TO THEIR COMMITMENT TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. BREZHNEV APPARENTLY CONTINUES TO SEE PRESIDENT NIXON'S SUMMIT VISIT AS AN IMPORTANT STAR IN HIS DETENTE CROWN, AND SOVIET COMMENTATORS MENTIONED THE SUMMIT FREQUENTLY DURING THE WEEK OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. WATERGATE REMAINS FOR THE LEADERSHIP A CAUSE OF CONCERN RATHER THAN AN OPENING FOR MISCHIEF.

7. U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO HEDGE THEIR INTERNAL POSITION BY PLAYING DOWN THE NEGATIVE POTENTIAL OF THE MFN/CREDITS ISSUE. EVEN THEIR PRIVATE REACTION TO US FOLLOWING THE EXIM BANK'S TEMPORARY CREDIT SUSPENSION WAS RESTRAINED. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREDITS CAUSES THEM CONCERN. BREZHNEV HAS PUBLICLY LINKED ECONOMIC WITH POLITICAL RELATIONS AND THE FALL-OFF IN JEWISH EMIGRATION FIGURES FOR JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, FOLLOWED BY A RESURGENCE IN MARCH, MAY CARRY A MESSAGE. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY STILL HOPE FOR A VIABLE COMPROMISE IN CONGRESS. OUR ECONOMIC CONTACTS HERE HAVE GIVEN NO HINT OF SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS IF COMPROMISE FAILS; THEY CONTINUE TO BE BULLISH ON THE EXPANSION OF BILATERAL ECONOMIC TIES. THERE IS A DANGER, HOWEVER, THAT INTERNAL OPPONENTS OF DETENTE COULD SEIZE ON A CREDIT REVERSAL TO QUESTION THE U.S.'S POLITICAL
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COMMITMENT TO IMPROVED RELATIONS.

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P R 011443Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7436

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

DIA WASHDC

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USLO PEKING

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AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 MOSCOW 4704

8. THE TONE OF DETENTE. WHILE THE SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET
WESTPOLITIK HAS NOT CHANGED OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS,
ITS TONE HAS. THERE IS NOW MORE WILLINGNESS IN THE
PRESS TO TAKE ON THE WEST IDEOLOGICALLY AND TO REVEL IN
WESTERN DISSENSIONS. WHILE SOME OF THE SHARPENED

RHETORIC IS PURE OPPORTUNISM DURING A TIME OF TROUBLES AMONG WESTERN COUNTRIES, IT IS PROBABLY ALSO THE PRODUCT OF A DECISION DISCUSSED AT THE MOSCOW MEETING OF WARSAW PACT IDEOLOGICAL SECRETARIES IN LATE DECEMBER; THERE HAVE BEEN REFLECTIONS IN OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WE DO NOT SEE THE HARsher LANGUAGE AS AN ASSAULT ON DETENTE BUT RATHER AS AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE LIMITS AND TO MAKE DETENTE MORE PALATABLE TO THE IDEOLOGICALLY INCLINED. THAT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THE MOTIVE FOR CC SECRETARY PONOMAREV'S JANUARY SPEECH DWELLING ON THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM. THE NEW TONE HAS BEEN MOST TYPICAL OF THE PRESS, BUT IT IS CREEPING INTO LEADERSHIP STATEMENTS AS WELL. BREZHNEV, FOR INSTANCE, OPENED FIRE ON THE WESTERN PRESS AT THE TIME OF THE POMPIDOU VISIT. WE WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO KEEP THEIR VERBAL SALLIES WITHIN LIMITS. THEY WOULD NOT WANT TO ENCOURAGE WESTERN RESISTANCE ON MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE TO MOSCOW, E.G. TRADE. NOR, IN OUR VIEW, DOES THEIR VERBAL EXPLOITATION OF THE U.S.-EUROPEAN RIFT EXTEND TO A DESIRE TO SEE A DEFINITIVE BREAK BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES - FOR THIS WOULD RAISE THE BOGEY OF A UNITED EUROPE WITH ITS OWN INTEGRATED DEFENSE STRUCTURE.

9. EAST-WEST ISSUES. THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE YEAR WAS A PERIOD OF SOVIET SPARRING OVER CSCE, MBFR, AND BERLIN. THE SECOND QUARTER SHOULD BRING MORE DEFINITE CLUES ABOUT MOSCOW'S WILLINGNESS TO BEND IN THE FACE OF WESTERN OBJECTIVES.

A. CSCE. DURING THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE YEAR, THE
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SOVIETS TALKED TOUGH ON CSCE, INSISTING ON THEIR VERSION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS, ON A HEAVILY CAVEATTED PREAMBLE TO BASKET THREE, AND ON A CONCLUDING SUMMIT, AND RESISTING EFFORTS BY SOME WESTERN DELEGATIONS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AS WELL AS THE WESTERN POSITION ON SUBSTANTIVE LANGUAGE ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND INFORMATION ISSUES. BY LATE MARCH, HOWEVER, NEW SOVIET FLEXIBILITY WAS APPARENT ON TWO OF THE STICKIER QUESTION - FRONTIERS AND INFORMATION. A COMPROMISE SEEMS TO BE SHAPING UP BETWEEN THE CONTENTS OF BASKETS ONE AND THREE AND ON A GENERAL PREAMBLE FOR BASKET THREE. THE NARROW PARAMETERS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON CONTACTS ARE ILLUSTRATED BY THE LIMITED NATURE OF SOVIET LIBERALIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC TRAVEL CONTROLS. BUT SOME GIVE IS LIKELY, SINCE THE OVERRIDING SOVIET CONCERN IS STILL TO HAVE CSCE END IN A WAY THAT WILL ALLOW THEM TO PLAY

IT AS ANOTHER MAJOR SUCCESS FOR THEIR DETENTE POLICY.

B. MBFR, UNLIKE CSCE, IS NOT A SOVIET-SPONSORED SHOW, AND THEIR APPROACH SO FAR - WHICH HAS BEEN FAIRLY RIGID ON SUBSTANCE - SHOWS LITTLE SIGN THAT THEY ARE IN A HURRY. THEIR DESIRE TO INCLUDE EUROPEAN FORCES IN STAGE ONE REDUCTIONS IS A STRONG ONE, BASED ON THE HOPE THAT, ONCE A PROCESS OF EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS BEGINS, THE STEAM WILL GO OUT OF ANY PLANS FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE INTEGRATION. THUS, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT EASILY GIVE IN ON THIS POINT.

C. BERLIN. SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT FRG ACTIONS IN BERLIN ESCALATED DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE YEAR, CULMINATING IN VEILED THREATS OF INTERFERENCE WITH THE TRANSIT ROUTES. AS WE SEE IT, THE POINT AT ISSUE - THE PLANNED ESTABLISHMENT
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P R 011443Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7437
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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A. THE SOVIETS HAVE CHINA ON THEIR MINDS THESE DAYS, PERHAPS EVEN MORE THAN USUAL. THE CHINESE EXPULSION OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN JANUARY AND CAPTURE OF A SOVIET HELICOPTER AND CREW IN MARCH HAVE FORCED AN EMBARRASSING BILATERAL PROBLEM ON MOSCOW. REACTION SO FAR HAS BEEN RESTRAINED, BUT THE LEADERSHIP MAY STILL BE CONSIDERING HOW TO RESPOND. THE CHINESE INTERNAL SITUATION LENDS ITSELF TO SPECULATION ABOUT A POWER STRUGGLE, WHICH IN TURN AROUSES BOTH CONCERN AND POSSIBLY SOME WISHFUL THINKING HERE. WHILE IT WOULD BE NATURAL FOR THE SOVIETS TO TAKE SOME CONTINGENCY STEPS IN THE PRESENT UNCERTAIN SITUATION, SUCH MOVES COULD IN THEIR WON RIGHT LEAD TO A HIGHER LEVEL OF SINO-SOVIET TENSION. MOREOVER, THERE IS ALWAYS THE RISK THAT A SUDDEN FLUID SITUATION, SUCH AS MIGHT BE BROUGHT ON BY THE DEATH OF MAO, COULD TEMPT THE SOVIETS TO LEND A HAND TO ELEMENTS IN CHINA WHICH THEY DEEM SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR MOSCOW BRAND OF MARXISM-LENINISM.

B. COMMUNIST CONFERENCES. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO PUSH PRIVATELY FOR A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE AND A WORLD CONFERENCE TO FOLLOW. SO FAR THEY HAVE BEEN CONTENT TO LET THE CALL FOR THE TWO CONFERENCES ISSUE FROM THE MOUTHS OF OTHERS. AS THE TIME FOR CONCRETE PLANNING DRAWS NEAR, THEY WILL PROBABLY ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THE CONFERENCES IN A MORE DIRECT WAY. AN UNSIGNED PRAVDA ARTICLE MARCH 30 NOTING THE CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION SINCE THE 1969 MEETING AND EXPRESSING UNDERSTANDING OF THE DESIRE OF FRATERNAL PARTIES FOR A NEW EXCHANGE OF VIEWS MAY MARK THE BEGINNING OF THIS PROCESS. THE SOVIETS WILL BE FORCED TO DEAL WITH THE UNCOMFORTABLE INDEPENDENT POSITIONS OF THE ITALIAN, ROMANIAN, AND OTHER PARTIES - A

PROBLEM WHICH INVOLVES PITFALLS FOR THE COMMUNIST
UNITY SO TREASURED BY MOSCOW.

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12. THE ECONOMY. SOVIET INTERNAL ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENT
FOR THE FIRST TWO MONTHS OF 1974 MATCHED OR EXCEEDED
PROJECTIONS. INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT WAS 9.1 PERCENT HIGHER
THAN FOR THE CORRESPONDING PERIOD IN 1973, AND OVERALL
PLAN TAGETS FOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION DURING JANUARY
AND FEBRUARY WERE THUS OVERFULFILLED (BY 6.8 PERCENT).
AS REPORTED BY THE PRESS, PRODUCTION FIGURES FOR A
NUMBER OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ECONOMIC SECTORS WERE
PARTICULARLY SATISFYING: THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES,
MACHINE CONSTRUCTION, INSTRUMENT MANUFACTURE, THE
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, AUTOMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS, AND THE
FOOD INDUSTRY. AS ALWAYS, SOME SECTORS LAGGED BEHIND,
CHIEF AMONG THEM AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, TRACTORS,
TEXTILES, PAPER AND CELLULOSE, AND CONSUMER GOODS.
THESE ARE THE SAME SECTORS WHICH NORMALLY FAIL TO
ACHIEVE PLAN GOALS. DESPITE THIS STRONG RUNNING START,
IT IS STILL FAR TOO EARLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER 1974
WILL BE A PRIME YEAR FOR THE SOVIET ECONOMY. TYPICALLY,
THESE FIRST MONTHS OF THE PLANY YEAR HAVE REFLECTED
ELATION, ENTHUSIASM AND PEP TALKS. THE YEAR'S ACTUAL
ACHIEVEMENTS WILL NOT BEGIN TO BE DISCERNIBLE UNTIL
SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER.
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TAGS: PFOR, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005